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1 Introduction
Over the past few decades, the battle for talent has become erce. A Lexis-Nexis search
reveals hundreds of lawsuits every year brought by the former employers against the new
(hiring) employers. Much attention has been given to the phenomenon that has come to be
known as predatory hiring. For instance, SAP AG, a software rm, sued its rival, Siebel, in
1999 alleging that Siebel engaged in predatory hiring practices directed at SAP and unfair
competition designed to injure SAPs business and damage SAPs ability to compete with
Siebel, according to the statement released at the time of the ling. The reason for the
lawsuit was that Siebel hired 27 of SAPs key employees, including the president of SAP.
Another example is that in 2007 Amvescap sued Deutsche Bank accusing it of raiding
16 top managers of its xed income team, which managed about 21 percent of the rms
total asset.1 The lawsuit said Deutsches scheme would threaten to severely cripple the
xed income group, and once other personnel had resigned there would be virtually nothing
left of the operation.Although anecdotal evidence suggests that predatory hiring is a hotly
debated topic, it is a subject on which surprisingly little work has yet been done to clarify
why hiring can be predatory. This paper aims to ll this gap by analyzing a simple model
of labor poaching in a duopolistic market.
Building on the work of Lazear (1986), this paper presents a model of predatory hiring.
I analyze a simple static model, in which two rms compete in the product market as well
as in the primary labor market. Drawing on the industrial organization literature, hiring is
1Some of the earlier examples include Ernst & Young in 1996 and Microsoft in 1997. In 1996, Ernst &
Young hired away over 90 key employees from Coopers & Lybrand; In 1997, Microsoft raided Borland by
hiring away 34 key development personnel.
2
predatory if competitive reasons are not strong enough to explain the hiring decision. That
is, predatory hiring is protable only when the e¤ects of decreased competition are taken
into account. Hence, the basic argument is similar to the deep-pocketstheory of predation
(see, e.g., McGee 1958; Telser 1966). The di¤erence is that in this paper predation occurs
through labor market poaching.
Predatory hiring works by making a su¢ ciently high wage o¤er that the current employer
cannot match. Put simply, an outside rm may poach a rivals employee(s) even if the
quality of the worker-employer match is not so good because the value of poaching includes
the extra prots obtained should the rival chooses to exit the market. The equilibrium
predation does not require incomplete information and signaling (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts
1982; Fudenberg and Tirole 1986). However, when the analysis is extended to the case of
asymmetric information, the outside rm can induce the old employer to exit even with a
lower match quality, in line with these literatures.
Predatory hiring can be thought of as an example of predatory buying, where a rm
pays a higher price for inputs or buys up more units than it needs in order to put rivals
at a disadvantage. For instance, in Weyerhaeuser v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber
Co. (2007), the defendant allegedly drove Ross-Simmons out of business by bidding up
the price of logs. In United Mine Workers v. Pennington (1965), large rm owners set a
high minimum wage for workers in a clear e¤ort to drive small coal mines out of business.
Employee poaching is di¤erent in that a rm poaches an essential input specically from the
victim, and I focus on the circumstances in which poaching can have anticompetitive e¤ects.
This paper contributes to the growing literature on competition for scarce resources (see,
e.g., Es½o et al. 2010; Marx and Sha¤er 2010; Song et al. 2010). In particular, Song et
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al. (2010) consider a model where one rms acquisition of essential input (pilots in their
paper) from the other rm improves the formers marginal cost and also worsens the latters
marginal cost. They show that when the essential inputs are scarce the market evolves into
a monopoly with the larger rm buying up the inputs from the smaller rm until the smaller
rm has no pilots left. The di¤erence is that in this paper, in contrast to those mentioned
above, the possibility of the victims exit (hence monopolization) is explicitly considered.
This paper is also related to Bernhardt and Scoones (1993) and McCannon (2008), where
a preemptively high wage o¤er deters outside rms from bidding for the key employee.
The reason is that outside rms must incur a cost to learn about the worker and its own
match quality with the worker. Then the initial employer signals a high match by making a
preemptively high wage o¤er. However, as Lazear (1986) points out, although for some jobs
it is di¢ cult for outsiders to learn about the rivals key employees, for others such as those in
highly visible managerial positions this informational cost is greatly reduced by reputation
and word-of-mouth communication, so that this cost is not prohibitively high.
The model presented in this paper is closest in spirit to that of Lazear (1986). In Lazears
model, poaching occurs only when the worker is better matched to the raiding rm. There-
fore, when employers are informed about their match qualities, the outside rm o¤ers a higher
wage, which the current employer does not match. This paper extends Lazears nding by
showing that a relatively less well-matched rm can poach the rivals worker in order to
damage the rivals ability to compete. The reason for di¤erent ndings is that in this paper,
in contrast to Lazears model, a workers worth at di¤erent employers are interdependent,
so that a rms own match as well as its rivals match with the worker matters.
Interrm mobility has received much attention recently as a source of knowledge spillover,
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which Arrow (1962) also pointed out in his seminal paper. For instance, using patent citation
data, a number of authors documented the importance of interrm mobility in transferring
knowledge (see, e.g., Almeida and Kogut 1999; Song et al. 2003; Singh and Agrawal 2011).
What the current paper adds to this issue is that the incentives to acquire knowledge (in-
cluding trade secrets) from the rival can sometimes lead to predatory poaching that causes
an irreparable harm to the original employer. Thus, the pros and cons of interrm mobility
need to be considered carefully in practice although this tradeo¤ is not tackled in this paper.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 and Section 4 show when predatory hiring occurs under perfect and asymmetric informa-
tion, respectively. Section 5 discusses post-employment lawsuits, and Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider two rms, or business units of larger entities, competing in a market. I label one
of them as an entrant (E) and the other as an incumbent (I). Each rm employs a worker
essential to its operation. (Here, a worker may represent a group of key employees). Without
loss of generality, suppose that one of the rms (i.e., the incumbent) tries to poach the other
rms (i.e., the entrants) worker. Let E denote the entrants match with its worker, and I
denote the match between this worker and the incumbent should he get hired away. Further,
let I with a hat (i.e., ^I) denote the incumbents match with its current worker. Workers
have a reservation wage w, and they choose whichever rm o¤ers a higher wage.
Without poaching, the entrants and the incumbents (gross-of-wage) expected prots are
dE(E; ^I) and 
d
I(E; ^I), respectively. It is assumed that the rms expected prots increase
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with its own match and decrease with the other rms match. Here, as in Song et al. (2010),
a higher match can be thought of as a lower marginal cost. If the incumbent successfully
hires away the entrants worker, however, the entrant has two options: It can exit the market,
in which case the entrant earns a zero prot. If the entrant exits, the incumbent becomes a
monopolist and its expected prots are given by mI (I), where 
m
I (I) > 
d
I(; ^I).2 I further
assume that mI (I) increases with the incumbents match with the newly hired worker.
Alternatively, after the incumbent poaches the worker, the entrant may decide to stay
in by hiring a replacement worker. The entrants expected prots are dE(^E; I), where E
with a hat (i.e., ^E) denote the entrants match with the replacement worker. How good a
replacement match is would depend on the depth of the entrants pool of employees. That is,
a large rm may easily identify another worker who is just as good as the former employee,
whereas a small rm may nd it very di¢ cult to hire one. This is because key employees
are scarce resources, and rm-specic human capital takes time to build.3 Hence, I assume
^E < E and denote the di¤erence between the old and new match by  = E   ^E > 0.
The sequence of the moves is as follows. At the beginning of the game, rms draw a
match with their respective worker from a distribution F () dened over [L; H ]. Then the
incumbent decides whether to poach and, if so, costlessly draws a match with the entrants
worker.4 If the incumbent makes an o¤er, the entrant has an opportunity to match the
2That is, if the incumbent successfully poaches the entrants worker, then it replaces the current match
(^I) with the new match (I). If the incumbent fails, however, it is the current match (^I) that inuences
the incumbents duopoly prots.
3For instance, when Google hired Kai-Fu Lee from Microsoft as the president of Google China, human
resource experts pointed out that, although China has a population of 1.3 billion, there are very few mainland
Chineses with more than 15 years relevant work experience and almost none with more than 20, most of whom
have no overseas experience and lack intercultural understanding and communication abilities (Santonocito
2005).
4Even if this cost is positive, but su¢ ciently small, the results in this paper would remain unchanged.
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outside o¤er before the worker decides whether to stay or leave. If the worker quits the job,
then the entrant must decide whether to exit or not. If it stays in, then the entrant draws a
replacement match and competes. If it exits, then the incumbent monopolizes the market.
Finally, prots are realized, and the game ends. For simplicity, there is no discounting
between stages.
For this model to generate nontrivial anticompetitive e¤ects of poaching, the victim has to
be sometimes better o¤ and sometimes worse o¤ by having its key employees poached by the
rival. Thus, I make the following assumptions about relative match values: dE(^E; H) < w

and dE(^E; L) > w
 for all ^E. That is, the incumbents lowest possible match (I = L)
with the worker could benet the entrant in duopoly competition, but the highest possible
realization (I = H) can drive the victim out of business. Finally, I assume that there are
two or more replacement candidates, so when negotiating the wages the rm has all the
bargaining power. This simplies the analysis, but it does not change qualitative results.
3 Benchmark Analysis
In this section, I assume that all matches are public information. Hence, the solution con-
cept in this section is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Consider the subgame when the
incumbent has poached the entrants worker. If the entrant stays in, then its expected prots
are dE(^E; I)  w, where the entrant hires a replacement worker and pays his reservation
wage. Since dE(^E; I) is decreasing in I , there is a value  such that the entrant decides
to exit if and only if I  , where  satises dE(^E; ) = w. Notice that  lies strictly
between L and H . Taking one step backwards, this would a¤ect how much the entrant is
7
willing to match the incumbents outside o¤er, which we denote by wI .
Specically, given its future move, the entrants optimal decision is to match an outside
o¤er up to dE(E; ^I) if I  , and up to dE(E; ^I)   (dE(^E; I)   w) if I < . That
is, if I  , then the entrant is willing to match an o¤er up to its expected prots, and if
I < , this amount is reduced by the entrants fallback payo¤s from staying in the market.
Now consider the incumbents (i.e., hiring rms) incentives. Since the incumbent knows the
entrants maximum willingness to match, if I <  then the incumbent can successfully poach
the worker by making a wage o¤er that is slightly higher than dE(E; ^I) (dE(^E; I) w).
Thus, the incumbents problem boils down to the following comparison,
dI(^E; I)  wI Q dI(E; ^I)  w.
Proposition 1 describes the nature of poaching when there is no change in market struc-
ture.
Proposition 1. Suppose the entrant stays in the market after the incumbent hires away
the worker. Then the poaching must be e¢ cient.
The above proposition puts a high bar that any predatory hiring claims need to clear
if the information structure is perfect. That is, unless the old (suing) rm is driven out
of the market, the outside rms hiring increases the total surplus, that is, the sum of the
two rms expected (gross-of-wage) prots. In the next section, however, I show that this
need not be true under asymmetric information. For now, let me proceed to the case where
the incumbent knows that the entrant would exit the market if it hires away the worker
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(i.e., when I  ). To successfully poach the worker, the incumbent has to o¤er at least
wI = 
d
E(E; ^I). The next result is that the incumbent has an incentive to poach and
protably monopolize the market.
Proposition 2. There is a value 0, 0  , such that an equilibrium exists in which the
incumbent poaches and the entrant exits if I  0.
If the incumbents match is above the certain threshold , then there are tradeo¤s in
making the decision to poach. On the one hand, since the entrant is willing to match an
outside o¤er up to all its expected prots, this increases the wage o¤er to successfully poach
the entrants worker. On the other hand, if the poaching is successful, the incumbent knows
that the entrant will exit the market, so the incumbent takes into account the added benet
from monopolization. The above proposition tells us that under the models specication
there is a range of parametrization where the incumbent poaches and the entrant exits.
Further, if this occurs at a certain value of the incumbents new match, then it occurs at all
levels of I higher than that.
Notice that Proposition 2 allows for the possibility that the increase in successful wage
o¤er more than o¤sets the potential gain from reduced competition. Specically, there could
be an intermediate range of parameter value (i.e.,   I  0), where although the entrant
would be driven out of the market, the wage o¤er would be too high to justify the potential
gain in prot. Therefore, the incumbent poaches only when its match with the worker is
su¢ ciently high. This brings up the question, How can poaching be predatory if only it
occurs when the new match is su¢ ciently high?To address this question, I draw on the
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industrial organization literature and dene what constitutes predatory hiring of the rivals
worker as follows.
Ordover andWillig (1981) proposed a denition of predation that is economically sound,
judicially workable, and broadly applicable to a wide variety of business practices,of which
the well-known cost-based test for predatory pricing is a special case. Specically, predatory
objectives are present if a practice would be unprotable without the exit it causes, but
protable with the exit. Thus, although a practice may cause a rivals exit, it is predatory
only if the practice would not be protable without the additional monopoly power resulting
from the exit.Therefore, I dene poaching as predatory if the incumbents prots under
the counterfactual outcome where the entrant stays in would be lower than its status quo
payo¤s, that is,
dI(^E; I)  wI < dI(E; ^I)  w.
Proposition 3. There is a value 00, 0 < 00, such that an equilibrium exists with predatory
hiring if I 2 [0; 00). The upper and lower bounds, 0 and 00, are non-increasing in .
Proposition 3 reveals that even with perfect information (hence the entrant observes
the incumbents predation), the incumbent can prey in equilibrium, where the upper and
the lower bounds on the incumbents new match are lower for an entrant with fewer viable
replacements. The proposition also shows that the entrants exit from the market does
not constitute su¢ cient proof of predation. To the contrary, exit-inducing poaching is not
predatory if it is a legitimate competitive decision. That is, if the incumbents match with
the worker is su¢ ciently high (i.e., I  00), then the incumbent would poach even if the




I show that the previous sections results hold in a more realistic information environment.
To be more precise, in Section 2s base model, I argued that for those in visible key positions
it is not di¢ cult for outsiders to learn about their potential match with the key workers
by looking at, for instance, appropriate performance metrics. However, one might question
whether it is reasonable to assume that the current employer knows what the outside rm
thinks its new match with the target worker will be. This may be, in fact, di¢ cult to know.
Therefore, this section focuses on the case where the incumbent continues to observe the
entrants match, but the entrant does not know the incumbents potential match with the
target worker.
This changes the model to a signaling game wherein the incumbent signals its match
with the entrants worker through its hiring decision. The appropriate solution concept
is thus perfect Bayesian equilibrium, and as usual all equilibria are characterized by the
following threshold strategy:5 If the incumbents match is above a certain threshold, then
the incumbent poaches the entrants worker. The incumbents wage o¤er, w, together with
the decision to poach signals to the entrant that the incumbents match with the key worker
lies in a certain range, so that the entrant updates its belief and optimally decides to exit
5It is straightforward to show that no fully revealing equilibrium exists. Suppose, to the contrary, that
two incumbent types, 1I and 
2
I , o¤er di¤erent wages, w
1 and w2, and the entrant exits in equilibrium.
Then the type o¤ering a higher wage will have an incentive to pool with the other type to lower the wage
bill. Given that the entrant exits, this does not a¤ect its (gross-of-wage) prots, and hence constitutes a
protable deviation.
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from the market. Specically, the entrant would be induced to exit by the belief that I is






1  F ()dI  0.
The left-hand side of the equation is the entrants expected prots if it decides to stay
in the market, in which case the entrant draws a replacement match ^E by paying him a
reservation wage w. The entrant also believes that I lies between 
 and H , and accord-
ingly updates its belief in a Bayesian fashion. If the resulting payo¤s are negative, then
the entrant decides to exit. Thus, a threshold strategy by the incumbent and the entrants
beliefs constitute equilibrium under asymmetric information. Notice that Bayesian updating
puts no restriction on the entrants beliefs o¤ the equilibrium path, which means that for
any higher o¤er than w the entrant would exit, and for any lower o¤er than w it will stay
in the market.
In particular, notice that since dE(^E; I) is decreasing in I , the left-hand side of the
above equation is decreasing in the threshold . Thus, there is a value ,   , at
which the entrants expected prots would be zero. A question of interest is whether this
minimum threshold  that drives the entrant out of market is lower than the corresponding
cuto¤ value  in the perfect information benchmark, and the answer is yes. This is because
dE(^E; I) = w
 at I = , so that 
 has to be strictly lower than  in order for the
average expected payo¤s to be zero. Thus,  is the lowest match the incumbent can signal
by poaching, and in any equilibrium with a higher threshold than  the entrant will be
induced to exit.
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Proposition 4. There is a continuum of equilibria. In each equilibrium, there is a value
,   , such that the incumbent poaches and the entrant exits if I  .
However, given an unexpected (out-of-equilibrium) wage o¤er wI , it seems reasonable that
the entrant would try to infer the incumbents match that is in fact more likely to benet
from making such an o¤er. As is well known in the literature on equilibrium renements,
such one-step-ahead forecast can eliminate equilibria sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs
that are not credible, and this often leads to a unique prediction. Specically, consider the
equilibrium renement criteria proposed by Grossman and Perry (1986) and Cho and Kreps
(1987). The reason why any equilibria with a threshold  higher than  are not credible is
because if the incumbents match is in fact I 2 [; ), then it can make a slightly higher
o¤er to signal I  . In the following, the threshold values, 0 and 00, in the benchmark
analysis appear together with the new thresholds values.
Proposition 5. In the unique equilibrium with credible beliefs, predatory equilibrium
exists if I 2 [; 00), where   0 < 00. The upper and lower bounds,  and 00, are
non-increasing in .
Hence, in the unique equilibrium, the range of the incumbents match for which predation
occurs can be larger than that under perfect information. The logic behind the above results
is that if the entrant were to stay in the market and I turns out to be 
, then the entrants
expected prots would be positive. However, with uncertainty over I , the entrant perceives
only a range of possible I values, so that even the marginal match for the incumbent appears
on average higher than it really is. This means that the incumbents expected prots at the
minimum threshold, had the entrant stayed in, could be in fact lower than its status quo
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prots, making the hiring decision predatory. As before, predation occurs for a lower range
of I values when the worker is harder for the entrant to replace.
5 Legal Implications
5.1 E¤ect of Lawsuits
As the anecdotes mentioned above suggest, raided rms are not shy about suing to recover
damages for injury. To the suing rm, a lawsuit brings potential benets in terms of increased
payo¤s. To the hiring rm, it adds to the potential costs of poaching the rivals employees.
To analyze the e¤ect of such lawsuits, in this subsection I extent the analysis in the previous
sections by introducing a lawsuit that the entrant could bring at the end of the game. The
mechanics of the lawsuit are that the entrant (plainti¤) seeks damages awards of d > 0
from the incumbent (defendant). For simplicity, I assume that ling and settling a lawsuit is
costless, and the court will nd the incumbent liable with an exogenously given probability
 2 (0; 1).
The e¤ect of lawsuit depends critically on how rms internalize the costs and benets.
First, the entrant foresees that if the incumbent poaches then it will bring a lawsuit and
expect to receive d from the incumbent, and this reduces the entrants maximum willingness
to match an outside o¤er. However, once the incumbent hires away its worker, the expected
damages payments do not a¤ect the entrants exit decision. Second, the incumbent would
take the expected payments into account when making a wage o¤er. Given the entrants
lower willingness to match, the incumbent can successfully poach at a lower wage, but it has
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to spend exactly the same amount as expected damages awards. Then the following result
holds.
Proposition 6. Suppose the entrant can sue the incumbent as described above. The set
of predatory equilibria is the same as those obtained in Propositions 3 and 5.
Notice that the lawsuit does increase the previous (suing) employers expected prots
by the expected damages awards conditional on poaching. In this sense, the lawsuit can
compensate for the loss of the key employee to the competitor. However, the expected
awards decrease the entrants willingness to match an outside o¤er, and the incumbents
initial o¤er by the same amount, so that the threshold values are not a¤ected. That is, the
possibility of a lawsuit allows the incumbent to poach the worker at a lower wage, but the
incumbent basically pays back the savings in wage costs in the form of damages awards. The
entrants payo¤s unambiguously increase, but it does not a¤ect the range of match values
where predation occurs.
5.2 U.S. Case Laws
Although very few plainti¤s succeed in winning a predation lawsuit given the tone and
points made by the Supreme Court, it is important to scrutinize theories of liability as more
and more predatory hiring claims are being made.6 In the early years of the Sherman Act,
courts used predatory intent to condemn unfair competition without articulating whether the
challenged behavior was harmful to consumers. For instance, in a landmark decision, Albert
6Judge Easterbrook (2003) said [f]alse positives should be handled by grouping raising rivalscosts with
predation into the set of practices governed by a wait-and-see attitude.
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Pick-Barth Co. v. Mitchell Woodbury Corp. (1932), the court found that the conspiracy to
eliminate a competitor by hiring away the competitors key personnel violates the Sherman
Act. Since then, however, the Pick-Barth line of cases has been largely repudiated.
Recent antitrust decisions require a high standard of proof for predatory hiring claims.
For instance, in duPont Walston, Inc. v. E. F. Hutton & Company, Inc. (1973) and in Tower
Tire and Auto Center, Inc. v. Atlantic Richeld Co. (1975), the courts found that a mere
conspiracy to harm the rivals business by hiring away its key personnel does not amount to
an antitrust violation. Similarly, in Universal Analytics, Inc. v. MacNeal-Schwendler Corp.
(1990), the defendant hired away ve of the plainti¤s six key technical employees, but the
court ruled that as long as the employer did not hire the competitors employees for the sole
purpose of destroying the competitor, it will not be held liable for predatory hiring.
What this paper demonstrates, however, is that hiring away a competitors key employ-
ees can result in monopolization and cause the old employer to exit from market, causing
antitrust injury. The model also predicts that predatory hiring can occur precisely when the
worker is relatively less valuable to the new employer. Regarding the sole-purpose element,
hiring away a competitors employees when they are not in fact good matches for the hiring
rm seems close to having the sole purpose of denying them to the competitor. Although
match qualities used in my analysis are hard to quantify in court proceedings, the paper
is a rst step towards studying factors that might impact the courts analysis of predatory
hiring.7
7Courts try to elicit information where available. For instance, in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc.
(1989), the court held that signicant monetary rewards not commensurate with the skills and qualications
of the newly hired worker can be circumstantial evidence of predatory hiring.
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6 Conclusion
This paper presents a framework to analyze poaching of essential inputs from rivals, where
rms can bid up the price of scarce human resources. The key element of the model is that
the poaching rm may force the victim to hire a replacement with a lower match quality by
hiring away its key employees. Predation can occur because the value of poaching includes
the extra prots obtained from the rivals exit. I discussed the implication of this model for
simple legal actions as well as some real world cases. Predatory equilibria exist even with
damages payment, and it arises when the worker is relatively a poor match to the hiring
rm. Whether such a model can produce more practical antitrust implications is left for
future research.
7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Since the incumbent need not o¤er anything more than dE(E; ^I) 
(dE(^E; I)   w) to hire away the entrants worker, the incumbent poaches if and only if
dI(^E; I)   wI = dI(^E; I)   dE(E; ^I) + dE(^E; I)   w > dI(E; ^I)   w, which can
be rearranged as dI(^E; I) + 
d
E(^E; I) > 
d
I(E; ^I) + 
d
E(E; ^I). Thus, the incumbent
optimally decides to poach if and only if the sum of the two rmsexpected gross prots
increase. 
Proof of Proposition 2. The incumbent would not o¤er anything more than dE(E; ^I)
because by o¤ering wI = dE(E; ^I) the entrant would not match. Notice that 
d
E(E; ^I) is
increasing in the rst element and decreasing in the second. Since E > ^E and dE(^E; ) =
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w, it follows that there is a value ,  > , such that dE(E; ) = w
. Thus, dE(E; ^I) < w

if and only if ^I > . Because mI (I) > 
d
I(; ^I) by assumption, it follows that 0 <
w   dI(E; ^I) + mI ()   dE(E; ^I) for ^I > . By continuity, there exists a value, 0,
0 < , such that mI (
0) = dE(E; ^I) + 
d
I(E; ^I)  w. Hence, the incumbent is better o¤
by poaching if and only if I  0. If such 0 falls below , dene 0 = . 
Proof of Proposition 3. By the denition given above, predation occurs when the incum-
bent poaches and dI(^E; I) wI < dI(E; ^I) w. First, suppose I < . Proposition 1 says
that the incumbent poaches only if dI(^E; I) wI > dI(E; ^I) w. Therefore, poaching is
not predatory in this case. Second, suppose I  . Then, from above the incumbent poaches
if I  0, where 0 satises mI (0)  dE(E; ^I) = dI(E; ^I)  w. Since mI (I) > dI(; ^I),
it follows that dI(^E; 
0)  dE(E; ^I) < dI(E; ^I)  w. Because dI(^E; I) is increasing in
I , there exists a value 
00, 00 > 0, such that dI(^E; 
00) dE(E; ^I) = dI(E; ^I) w. Since
dE(E; ^I) = wI , predation occurs if I < 
00.
Suppose  increases. Since ^E = E   , this means that the entrants replacement
match, ^E, decreases. Notice that a rms expected prots under competition depend pos-
itively on its own match and negatively on the other rms match. Since dI(^E; 
00)  
dE(E; ^I) = 
d
I(E; ^I)   w denes the value 00, if ^E decreases, then 00 must decrease.
Similarly, the equation mI (
0) = dE(E; ^I) + 
d
I(E; ^I) w denes 0, on which ^E has no
e¤ect. Thus, as long as   0, then 0 is invariant to . On the other hand, the equation
dE(^E;
) = w denes , where  must decrease if ^E decreases. Therefore, if 
0 < , then
0 = , in which case 0 is decreasing in . 
Proof of Proposition 4. For this to be an equilibrium, the incumbent must make an o¤er
18
that the entrant would not match and also must be better o¤ by poaching. Since the entrant
would exit in equilibrium if the incumbent o¤ers w, the incumbent must o¤er at least
dE(E; ^I) to outbid the entrants willingness to match. Note that from the previous proofs
0 satises mI (
0) = dE(E; ^I) + 
d
I(E; ^I)  w. If   0, then the incumbent for which
I 2 [0; ]must not be better o¤by poaching. It su¢ ces to set w = mI (0) dI(E; ^I)+w
for I 2 [0; ]. If  < 0, then the incumbent for which I 2 [; 0] will not want to o¤er
w = dE(E; ^I) given lower expected payo¤s; hence, 
 is redened as 0.
Then, poaching is indeed protable for the incumbent since for all I  , mI (I) w 
mI (
0)  dE(E; ^I) = dI(E; ^I) w in the latter case where  = 0; and also because for
all I  , mI (I)   w  mI ()   (mI (0)   dI(E; ^I) + w)  dI(E; ^I)   w in the
former case where   0. Finally, there is no restriction on the entrants o¤-the-equilibrium
beliefs, so it can be any beliefs such that the entrant optimally exits if wI > w and stays
in if wI < w. For instance, it su¢ ces to set for any o¤-the-equilibrium o¤er wI > w, the
entrants belief is I 2 [; H ] for some ,  > , and for any o¤-the-equilibrium o¤er
wI < w
 the entrants belief is I 2 [; H ], for some ,  < . 
Proof of Proposition 5. The entrants optimal strategy needs to be specied for any
possible beliefs. Being the last one to move, the entrants exit decision is to exit if and only
if its beliefs are such that I 2 [; H ], where   . Suppose that the entrant observes
the incumbents out-of-equilibrium o¤er wI > w. If I 2 [; H ], then the incumbent
stands to gain from poaching, so an arbitrarily small increase in wage o¤er does not change
the incumbents optimal decision. However, if I 2 [L; ], then the incumbent would
not gain from such a deviation. Therefore, the entrant puts zero weight on I 2 [L; ]
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upon observing wI . If this is indeed the entrants belief, then it would be protable for the
incumbent type I 2 [; H ] to poach by making a wage o¤er that signals I  . That is,
if the incumbents match is   I < , then it is better o¤by deviating to the equilibrium
with a lower threshold until the threshold level reaches the minimum, .
Suppose 0 < . There are two subcases: If   0, then from the previous proof  is
dened as 0. If  > 0, then  remains the same. On the other hand, from the previous
proofs 0 is dened as , where  < . Thus,   0. Suppose next   0. Because
 < 0,  is dened as 0, and thus  = 0. Therefore, it holds that   0. Since
dI(^E; I) is increasing in I , poaching is also predatory at any lower value of I if it is
predatory at a higher value of I . It thus follows that predation occurs for I 2 [; 00].
That 00 is non-increasing in  was already proved in Proposition 3. Regarding ,
consider any two values of , such that 1 < 2. Suppose
R H
(1)
[dE(E   1; I)  
w] f(I)
1 F ((1))dI = 0. Since 
d
E(E   1; I) < dE(E   2; I) for any 1 < 2, it
must be true that
R H
(1)




[dE(E   2; I)   w] f(I)1 F ((1))dI , is a decreasing, continuous function, it
follows that if 	((1)) < 0, then there exists a value (2) < (1) such that
	((2)
) = 0. 
Proof of Proposition 6. Following the incumbents poaching, the entrant expects to gain
d regardless of its exit decision. The exit decision is based on the condition, dE(^E; I) w+
d  d, under perfect information, and R H

h
dE(^E; I)  w + d
i
f(I)
1 F ()dI  d, under
asymmetric information. Therefore, the thresholds are the same as before. Conditional
on the entrants exit, the incumbent poaches when mI (I)   wdI   d > dI(E; ^I)   w.
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Since the entrants maximum willingness to match is dE(E; ^I)   d, it follows that wdI =
dE(E; ^I) d. Since then mI (I) wdI d = mI (I) dE(E; ^I), the threshold 0 remains
the same. Finally, poaching is predatory if dI(^E; I)  wdI   d < dI(E; ^I)  w. For the
same reason, the threshold 00 remains unchanged. 
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